Emigration Prospects and Human Capital in the Developing Countries: The Possibility of the Qualitative Brain Gain by Kouni, Mohamed
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Emigration Prospects and Human
Capital in the Developing Countries: The
Possibility of the Qualitative Brain Gain
Mohamed Kouni
Faculte´ des Sciences Economiques et de Gestion, UNiversity of Tunis
El Manar
17. September 2010
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/25074/
MPRA Paper No. 25074, posted 18. September 2010 09:18 UTC
  
1 
Emigration Prospects and Human Capital in the Developing 
Countries: The Possibility of the Qualitative Brain Gain  
 
              Mohamed KOUNI 1 2 3 
 
 
 
Abstract: In this paper we study the net effect of high-skilled emigration. Hence, we elaborate a 
simple theoretical model that studies the net effect of high-skilled emigration. The result showed that 
the emigration in the case where the fraction of human capital that emigrates is inferior to the critical 
level (equal to the difference between one and the elasticity of brain gain with respect to emigration), 
as well as in the case of the strong selectivity adopted, the emigration has the possibility to create a 
quantitative and qualitative brain gain. Indeed, to determine the net effect of brain drain we propose a 
new method that decomposes the gross investment of human capital into two components: the net 
domestic incentive effect and the net quantitative brain drain effect. Through This decomposition we 
can determine the net quantitative effect that arrives from the interior situation and the one arriving 
from the prospects effect. Finally, we tempt to define the indicator of the qualitative effect of this 
phenomenon. The empirical results showed that the emigration has an important effect on the human 
capital investment. Thus, the majority of countries have the possibility to register a net quantitative 
gain. Nevertheless, little of countries only have the possibility to record a qualitative brain gain. 
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1. Introduction  
The international migration of skilled workers has augmented since the nineties. In fact, the 
emergence of the new literature of brain drain reviewed the old results, while showing that 
this phenomenon is more complex than a simple flight. Stark et al. (1997); Stark et al. (1998); 
Stark and Wang (2002); Beine et al. (2001, 2003, 2008) and Docquier and Rapoport (2004, 
2007) sustain that the emigration prospects modify the structures of investment in education 
of the residents. Motivated by a more high remuneration, the residents multiply their 
education efforts to have emigrated finally. In presence of very selective policies all skilled 
workers cannot emigrate. Except a minority that emigrate. The rest of workers remain in their 
source country, consequently this quantity is qualified as a brain gain. However, the result of 
the new brain drain literature is not confirmed by some studies. Among these works the one of 
Schiff (2005) that finds that the brain gain is small or negative. It's clear that a new debate on 
the consequences on source countries is translated by the recent studies. 
However, some critics can be addressed to these studies. First, the majority of these studies 
elaborate certain of models that study the individual behavior. Thus, they aggregate these 
analyses for the global society. Second, these models are not incorporating the negative effect 
represented by the human capital flight. Third, they don't achieve any comparison between the 
incentive effects generated by the internal conditions in the source countries and the effects of 
the emigration perspectives.   
Starting from these remarks, we elaborate a simple theoretical model basically inspired from 
the Solow model and it referred to the works of Boulila (1997) and Docquier and Rapoport 
(2007). Indeed, we aim to study the net effect of high skilled emigration. Thus, we incorporate 
the double effects: negative and positive effects equally. The negative effect is the quantity 
(rate) of skilled individuals that emigrates and the positive effect is the quantity (rate) that 
remains in its source country in the long term. Indeed, to determine the net effect of brain 
drain we propose a new method to decompose the gross investment of human capital into two 
components: the net domestic incentive effect and the net quantitative brain drain effect. 
Through This decomposition we can determine the net quantitative effect that arrives from the 
interior situation and the one that coming from the prospects effect. Beine et al. (2008) 
determine the net effect of skilled-emigration and show that some countries have a net brain 
gain, but others have a negative brain drain effect. It’s important to signal that the works study 
the brain drain effects without resorting to decomposition, but it is essential to distinguish 
between the two effects. Finally, we tend to define the possibility to have a qualitative effect 
of this phenomenon. 
 The principal contribution in this paper can be summarized as follows:  
• The incorporation of the two effects of brain drain (negative and positive) in the 
theoretical model.  
• The measurement of two new indicators (human capital indicator, and indicator of 
emigration prospects )   
• The decomposition of gross investment into two elements; the net domestic incentive 
effect and the net quantitative brain drain effect. 
• Finally, this paper showed the possibility to register a qualitative effect. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: in section two we describe the theoretical 
model. In section three we illustrate the method to define and measure the net effect of brain 
drain. In the last section we conclude.         
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2. The model : The net theoretical effect of brain drain  
  We study in this section the situation of a small economy. The production is determined by 
two factors: the labour (L) and the human capital (H): 
αα −
==
1)(),( ALHLHFY                                                                                                       (1) 
WithY H L A  and 10 << α   are respectively the output level, the human capital, the all 
active population, the labour productivity and the elasticity of the production with respect to 
human capital. 
The output per efficiency unit is as follows: 
αhy =                                                                                                                                       (2) 
h  is the human capital by head. We suppose, indeed, on the base of the work of Docquier and 
Rapoport (2007) that h  is superior to one, for the simple reason that the unskilled part of 
population have a human capital index equal to one. The accumulation of this factor is 
provided in following a public and private effort denoted (s) (fraction of national income). 
This accumulation is decreased by ( εδ + ) that signify respectively; the depreciation rate and 
the fraction of the human capital that emigrate. ε   can be defined as the report between the 
emigrant human capital ( Mh ) and the resident human capital ( h ) : h
hM
=ε .       
Moreover, L  increase at the natural rate (n) and decrease by the emigration rate (m). Also, the 
productivity increases with a constant rate noted (g). 
The high-skilled emigration rate is defined by two factors, the differential incomes and 
institutional factors set. It takes the following standard form: 
Iyyam −−= ∗ )log(log                                                                                                           (3) 
This rate is positively correlated with the differential incomes )( yy −∗  and negatively 
correlated with the institutional factors (I).   
At the initial period, economy registers a flight of a number of high-skilled workers. Also, on 
the basis of the model of Schiff (2005) we consider that the economy cannot recuperate the 
human capital loss in short and medium terms. Schiff suggests that there is a transition period 
formed after emigration. Through this period, number of individuals, affected by emigration 
prospects, decides to invest in education. Indeed, in the medium term there’s not brain gain. 
Economy can register a positive effect in the long term when this period is over. At this stage 
there are two effects realised; a positive effect engendering an investment superior to the 
number of emigrants, and negative effect measured by a high-skilled workers that emigrate. 
We assume that each skilled emigrant takes on average with him a fraction of human capital 
measured by ))/(( hLH εε = 4; withε  is the part of stock of human capital that emigrated, 
defined as preceding ( 1>ε , because 1>h  for all skilled-emigrants)5 and )/( LH  is the 
human capital by head. Moreover, the economy has obtained a new number of high skills that 
it is superior or inferior to the emigrated number. Consequently, the quantitative gain is 
inferior or superior to brain loss. We assume, therefore, that the individual fraction of gain 
noted by q and defined by the ratio: ( LQq /= , where Q , represents the new skills that 
                                                 
4
 MM hhhhLH =∗= )/()/((ε , this is the human capital taken by an emigrant on average. 
5
 Many studies showed that the emigrant human capital is superior to the resident human capital. Therefore we assume, for 
the reason of the high selectivity, that hhM > . In this case , 1>ε . 
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obtained their diploma under the emigration incentives) is inferior or superior to m . Thus, (q) 
is positively correlated with (m) because the brain gain is the result of the evolution of 
emigration prospects. In fact, we assume that 0)( >∂
∂
m
q
 and 0)( 2
2
<∂
∂
m
q
. Finally, in spite 
of many studies showed that the brain drain is superior to brain gain; we cannot assume that 
mq < . Therefore, we take in our analysis the two cases: mq <  and mq > . 
The accumulation function in this case, can be written as follows: 
[ ]qmnghshh −−−++−=• )1()( εδα                                                                                 (4)            
Therefore, the growth rate of human capital per efficiency unit equal to: 
[ ]qmgnshhhg h −−−++−== −
•
)1()(/ 1 εδα                                                                      (5)   
Our principal objective in this paper is the verification of the gain or the loss in term of human 
capital in the case of equilibrium with emigration (this equilibrium is defined by the 
equality: [ ]qmgnsh −−−++=− )1()(1 εδα ). Indeed, to attain this objective, it’s important 
to compare between the curve of human capital depreciation in the case of closed economy 
( )( δ++= gnC ) (the Solow model) and the one in our equilibrium 
( [ ] 1)1()( Cqmgn =−−−++ εδ ). If )()( 1CC > , the new equilibrium is located below the 
(C). This means that this equilibrium associate a human capital level which is superior to the 
one associated in the absence of high-skilled emigration (brain gain). On the contrary, 
economy registers a brain loss. 
 
2.1  The characteristics of (C1): 
 
To visualize the pace of this curve, we tend to determine the derivative of his equation with 
respect to (h) as follows: 
[ ] 0)()1()(/1 fp ormqhmhC ∂∂+−∂∂−=∂∂ ε                                                                     (6) 
This derivative is negative when [ ]1)1)(( +=+∂∂> bmqε , because 0)( <∂∂ hm 6, and 
1>ε . In this case (C1) is decreased with (h). If ( 1+< bε ), this curve is increased with 
respect to (h).  
The second derivative takes the following form:    




∂
∂
∂
∂
−




∂
∂
−−∂
∂
=∂∂ 22
2
2
22
1
2 ))(()()1()(/ hmm
q
m
q
h
mhC ε                                           (7) 
It’s clear that this derivative is positive when ( 1+> bε ). Indeed, in this case (C1) is convex. 
However, if ( 1+< bε ) the sign of this derivative is not clear, therefore (C1) can be convex or 
concave.  
We assume, also that 10 << m  and 10 << q . Thus, we define the following condition7: 
                                                 
6
 See equations (2) and (3). 
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Equilibrium condition   
For b+== ∗ 1εε , (C) is equal to (C1) and the equilibrium is located on (C) (this equilibrium 
is equivalent at the one of Solow).  
For b+=< ∗ 1εε , (C) is superior to (C1) and the equilibrium is located under (C).  
For b+=> ∗ 1εε , (C) is inferior to (C1) and the equilibrium is located above (C).  
  
2.2 The long term dynamic transition: The case of high-skilled emigration: 
 
In this subsection we treat the different possibilities of equilibrium. According to previous 
condition, we can characterize two possibilities of equilibrium with emigration: 
• Equilibrium in the case where b+=> ∗ 1εε : 
In this case, (C) is inferior to (C1), so the equilibrium is located above (C). The following 
graphic illustrate this case:      
Graphic 1: The long term dynamic transition: The case where b+=> ∗ 1εε  
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From this graphic, it’s clear that the equilibrium with emigration associate a human capital 
level (h*m) which is inferior to the one associated by the equilibrium without emigration 
(h*sm). In the same way, the growth rate in the case of emigration (ghm) is lower than the one 
of economy without emigration (ghsm). In spite of registering a quantitative gain, the economy 
cannot recuperate the qualitative loss when the emigrated part of human capital is superior to 
critical level ( b+=> ∗ 1εε ).  
 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
7
 See the proof and graphics that demonstrate this condition, thus the different forms of the curve of human capital 
depreciation in the appendices  
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• Equilibrium in the case where b+=< ∗ 1εε : 
Now (C) is superior to (C1), thus the equilibrium is located under (C). The following graphics 
illustrate this case:  
 
     Graphic: 2: The long term dynamic transition: The case where b+=< ∗ 1εε  and C1 is 
convex 
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    Graphic: 3: The long term dynamic transition: The case where b+=< ∗ 1εε  and C1 is 
concave 
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In spite of marking a qualitative loss, the economy succeeded in realizing a net gain in 
terms of human capital. This gain can be interpreted as follows: the high-skilled emigration, 
through the incentive mechanism, encourages the individuals to invest in education. Finally 
the economy obtains a human capital quantity bigger than the one that emigrated. We can, 
now, ask the question: how does the economy recuperate the qualitative loss (especially that 
the human capital quality that emigrated is superior to the one of resident human capital) in 
order to produce a bigger quantity of human capital? Once this is attained, we assume that the 
gain is the result, also, of the amelioration of the human capital quality. This means that 
in the presence of high-selective immigration policies, the emigration prospects create a 
competitive environment between the investors. Individuals incited by the emigration know, 
in advance, that a small part among the candidates can emigrate; therefore, they search to 
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ameliorate the level and the quality of their skills. Finally, just a part, among these 
competitive investors, that emigrates. Other part remains in his source country. Consequently, 
the source country has the possibility to register amelioration in the human capital quality. 
2.3 The effect of an increase in ε  on the variables of the stationary state: 
In this part we study the impact of an increase of ε  on the level and rate of human capital. 
For obtain this result we effectuate the derivative of ∗h 8 and hg  with respect toε . 
0))1()(())1()((1
1/ 2
1
* <



−−−++
−




−−−++−=∂∂
−
qmgn
ms
qmgn
sh
εδεδαε
α
α
                     (8) 
Thus: 
0/ <−=∂∂ mg h ε                                                                                                                      (9) 
It’s clear that an increase of ε , decreases the equilibrium level of human capital. In spite of 
that in the long run the economy registers a human capital level bigger than the one initially 
obtained. Therefore, the qualitative loss (increase of ε ) reduces the level and the growth rate 
of this factor. Thus, even if economy obtain at equilibrium a net quantitative gain as well as, 
gross qualitative gain, an increase of the fraction of human capital, decreases the level and the 
growth of human capital. 
Graphically, this problem can be represented by the movement of C1. Consequently, whenε  
increases C1 moves upwards because 0/1 >=∂∂ mC ε . Note, that for allε , this curve moves 
upwards. Indeed, for three graphics (1, 2, 3) and for b+=< ∗ 1εε  or b+=> ∗ 1εε , this 
movement permits the movement of the equilibrium towards the left with respect to 
equilibrium with emigration Em ( 1−αsh  no affected).           
 
• The effect of an increase of m  on the variables of the stationary state: 
 
The effect of an increase of m can be schematized as follows: 








−−−++
∂
∂+−




−−−++−=∂∂
−
2
1
*
))1()((
))(1(
))1()((11/ qmgn
m
q
s
qmgn
smh
εδ
ε
εδα
α
α
                     (10) 
Indeed; 




∂
∂+−=∂∂
m
q
mg h )1(/ ε                                                                                                    (11) 
The sign of the two equations is not clear. It’s determined by the level of ε , if b+=> ∗ 1εε , 
equations (10) and (11) are negative and if b+=< ∗ 1εε , these equations are positive. 
Therefore, an increase of emigration rate (m) can improve the level and the growth rate of 
human capital when b+=< ∗ 1εε . This means that an increase of (m) create the incentive 
effects by the evolution of the emigration prospects. This situation leads the economy towards 
the new equilibrium where the human capital is so superior to the previous equilibrium. 
Geometrically, this problem can be appreciated by the movement of the curve of human 
capital depreciation (C1). The derivative of (C1) with respect to (m) can be written as follows:  
                                                 
8
 [ ] αεδ −−−−++= 1/1* ))1()(( qmgnsh  
  
8 
)(1/1 m
q
mC ∂
∂
−−=∂∂ ε                                                                                                       (12) 
This result is positive when b+=> ∗ 1εε  and is negative when b+=< ∗ 1εε . It’s clear that 
if b+=< ∗ 1εε , (C1) moves downwards and if b+=> ∗ 1εε  this curve moves upwards. In 
the case where b+=< ∗ 1εε , the economy registers a brain gain. In the other case 
( b+=> ∗ 1εε ), an increase of (m) decreases the level and the growth rate of human capital. 
Therefore, the equilibrium is located at the right (left) with respect to equilibrium with 
emigration Em, when b+=< ∗ 1εε  (when b+=> ∗ 1εε ), while giving a level of bigger 
(weaker) human capital. 
To summarize this section we adopt the following proposition: 
 
Proposition: 
 
For all 10 << m , 1>ε , and  
• If b+=< ∗ 1εε , the emigration prospects can generate: 
1. A net quantitative human capital gain.  
2. The possibility to obtain a qualitative human capital gain. 
3. An increase of the human capital fraction that emigrated )(ε  reduces the 
growth rate and the level of human capital. 
4. An increase of the emigration rate (m) improves the growth rate and the level 
of human capital.  
• If b+=> ∗ 1εε , the emigration prospects can generate: 
1. The economy realizes a net qualitative brain loss and the equilibrium 
generate a human capital level inferior to the one given by the equilibrium 
without emigration. 
2. An increase of the )(ε  and / or of the (m) decreases the growth rate and the 
level of human capital.  
Proof     
      
When b+=< ∗ 1εε , C1 < C, consequently the equilibrium with emigration is located below 
C. thus, the economy registers, always in this case, a human capital gain. 
When b+=> ∗ 1εε , C1 > C, therefore, this equilibrium is located above C and the economy 
registers, always in this case, a net qualitative and quantitative loss in term of human capital. 
In the other hand, in spite of that the quality of the human capital gotten following the 
emigration is lower to the one of the emigrants, the economy registers an important human 
capital gain (a net quantitative gain) and in presence of the high selective policies, the 
emigration prospects create a competitive environment between investors. Therefore, these 
investors tend to improve the quality of their human capital. Finally, one part emigrates and 
the rest of the gained human capital registers an improvement of his quality.         
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3. The empirical study  
 
3.1. The model      
 
In our empirical part, and after define and measure some new indicators, we estimate the 
equation adopted by Beine et al. (2008) and we use the Docquier and Marfouk data base 
(2006). This equation is based on the Solow model with β convergence and this is conforming 
to our model presented in previous section. In fact, this specification can be written as 
follows: 
 
ε++++++= )()_(ln)(ln)(ln)(ln)/ln( 90590490390,290,1090,00, RMcpopdcgdpcgmpchcchh Hmoymoymoy   (13) 
                                                                                     
Where, )/ln( 90,00, moymoy hh , 90,ln moyh , 90,ln Hgmp , 90ln gdp , 90_ln popd , 90RM  et ε  are 
respectively the gross human capital investment, the human capital in 1990, the emigration 
prospects indicator, the gross domestic product , the population density, the ratio of 
international remittances on GDP and the error term. 
It should be noted that the negative sign of the coefficient c1 translates the convergence of the 
model. Moreover, following our theoretical model and the new brain drain literature, c2 is 
positive. The per capita GDP is Proxy of the individual liquidity which has a positive 
coefficient. However, the sign associated to the coefficient of the population density is 
negative. This variable is Proxy of education cost. Moreover, the remittances have a positive 
effect on the investment in human capital (the sign of its coefficient is positive). 
Moreover, the sample of countries chosen for our empirical work comprises 58 middle-
income countries.  
For the reason that the data of various variables concerning the skilled emigration were 
available only on very limited period we choose to adopt a cross section analysis. Although 
the data of skilled emigrants exist only for the two years 1990 and 2000 (according to the DM 
database (2006)), all works adopted this type of modeling (Beine and Al (2001, 2003, 2007, 
2008); Lucas (2005), Docquier et al. (2007, 2008)…).    
 The tests results showed the existence of two problems: the heteroscedasticity and the 
endogeneity of the two variables,  90,ln Hgmp  and 90ln gdp . To remove the first problem we 
adopted the method of White. However, to surmount the second problem we use the method 
of the instrumental variables (IV).  
 
3.2  The human capital indicator     
  
As we already mentioned, we repeat the estimation of equation (13) while adopting new 
measures of some indicators: the human capital and the emigration prospects indicators. 
Concerning the human capital indicator, Beine et al. (2008) adopt the ratio of the skilled 
population on the total population as a measure of human capital. Nevertheless, this measure 
cannot reflect efficiently this variable for some reasons. First, this ratio reveals the share of 
skilled population but not the education level. This means that it hasn't mentioned on the 
number of years for each education level. Second, this share ranging between zero and one, 
does not make it possible to realize a good comparison between countries, as well as its 
average is about the same for all. Therefore, it does not make it possible to guarantee the 
disparity between countries. Third, because it is ranging between zero and one, this measure 
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cannot satisfy our theoretical hypothesis ( 1>h ). For all these reasons we adopt the following 
human capital measure by the next system of equations:      
1))18/8(*)(())18/4(*(
,,,,
+++= jHt
j
Mt
j
Lt
j
Lt qqqh                                                      (14) 
1))18/12(*())18/5.10(*(
,,,
++= jHt
j
Mt
j
Mt qqh                                                          (15) 
1))18/5.15(*(
,,
+= jHt
j
Ht qh                                                                                       (16) 
Where jLth , , 
j
Mth ,  and 
j
Hth ,   are respectively the lowest ( L ), the middle ( M ) and the 
highest ( H ) levels of individual human capital. Moreover, jLtq , , jMtq ,  and jHtq ,  designed the 
lowest , the middle and the highest shares skilled population defined by Docquier and 
Marfouk (2006) as follows:   
j
st
s
j
st
s
j
st
j
stj
st MR
MRq
,,
,,
, ∑∑ +
+
=                                                                    (17) 
With jstR ,  and 
j
stM ,  are respectively the resident population which has a skills level, 
equal to s ( HMLs ,,= ), and the one which emigrated and it has the same skills level. 
We follow Docquier and Marfouk (2006) and Barro and Lee (1993, 2000) to 
determine the various means of the schooling period for each skills level. In fact, we 
consider that the low skills level can be defined by 8 schooling years. The middle level can 
be measured by the interval between 9 and 12 years, and the high skills level can be 
expressed by the interval varied from 13 to 18 years. Moreover, 1 is the skills indicator of 
the unskilled population (Docquier and Rapoport (2004)). We assume that the unskilled 
individual has a minimum of skills generated from his life experience. Finally, we calculate 
the mean human capital for each country as follows:   
3
,,,,
j
Ht
j
Mt
j
Lt
j
moyt hhhh ++=                                                                                   (18) 
3.3 The indicator of the emigration prospects     
The previous studies in this field have been based on the emigration rate to measure 
the emigration prospects. Nevertheless, this approximation suffers from some limits as 
follows: 
• The emigration decision does not depend on the emigration probability only. 
It depends in really, on the emigration cost, the wages differential between 
areas and on the skills level of emigrant. Thus, the rational emigrant is 
called to make a calculation of expected benefits before deciding to 
emigrate. The probability cannot reflect exactly the emigration prospects in 
this case.  
• Then, the economic and social changes can play a big role in the change of 
the choice of destination. Consequently the probability which is based on 
the emigration rate of the previous period can fall the determination of the 
emigration prospects effect.   
• Finally, the emigration rate is a source of loss (the brain drain), whereas the 
authors considered it as a benefit source in the model. To calculate a net 
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benefit, the same authors used this rate as a Proxy of loss. A sort of 
contradiction appeared consequently. 
For these reasons, we propose a new approximation of this indicator. Indeed, it 
takes account of several factors as the human capital, the international relative 
income, the probability and the emigration cost. Moreover, to calculate this 
indicator we adopt the equation that measures the expected benefits (critical 
threshold) for the high skilled emigration presented by Docquier and Rapoport 
(2004) as follows: 
[ ]1))/(1(**1
,,,,,
−−Ω+−= jHt
j
t
j
t
j
Ht
j
Ht
j
Ht
j
Ht hkhmhgmp                                    (19) 
Where, jHtgmp , ,
j
Htm , , 
j
tΩ  and 
j
tk  are respectively the emigration prospects 
indicator, the emigration rate, the international relative income 
( wwjt /∗=Ω ), ∗w  and w  are the wage of the host country and the one of the 
source country) and the emigration cost. Indeed, in this paper we approximate 
j
tΩ  by the ratio between the average of per capita GDP of thirty OECD 
countries and the per capita GDP of each source country. Moreover, to measure 
j
tk  we follow Docquier et al. (2007) which consider that the distance between 
countries constitute a veritable proxy for the emigration cost. In fact, as the 
authors we calculate this cost as the ratio of the distance between each source 
country and the average distance from the 4 OECD countries which are the 
United States, Australia, Japan and France, on the middle-income of the same 
countries (expected income).    
3.4 The Results:  
Our principal interest in this work consists to determine the effect of the emigration 
prospects on the gross investment in human capital. It’s clear that the model is globally 
significant in all the regressions (Tables 1). The results postulate indeed, that the 
emigration prospects have a positive and highly significant effect. The coefficient of this 
variable appears positive in all the regressions. In the same way, it is significant at the 
level of 1% in all the regressions. The elasticities related at this variable vary from 0.017 
to 0.02. Beine, Docquier and Rapoport (2008) obtained a coefficient of the emigration rate 
equal about 5%. It appears clear, consequently, that the result obtained by the authors is 
likely to be over-estimated.  
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Table 1: Effect of the emigration prospects on the human capital investment: Estimation 
Results by the method of the instrumental variables (GMM): Dependent variable: 
)/ln( 90,00, moymoy hh  : Case of the middle-income countries. 
 
 
( ): The t-statistics. *, ** and ***: denote significance at respectively 10, 5 and 1% levels.  
Endogenous variables: ln gmpH, 90 and  ln gdp90 
Instruments:   ln hmoy, 90, ln_pop_90, ln_m_total_90, ln_gdp_80, RM90 , ln_d_pop90 
 
 
Because the emigration rate is not the only variable which reflects the emigration prospects, 
its use as Proxy of the prospects is likely to especially inflate the source of estimation bias, 
necessary for the countries which have a high emigration rate and low-income. In total, the 
emigration prospects exert, as the literature of the new economy of the brain drain proves it, a 
positive and significant effect on the human capital investment in the middle-income 
countries.     
The other variables have also an important effect on the human capital. The coefficient of 
GDP equal about to 0.04 in all the estimations and it is significant at the level of 1%. Thus, 
the income level constitutes the one among the principal determinants of the gross investment 
in human capital. This correlation supports indeed, the idea for which the emigration can 
encourage only people having an important financial capacity. Moreover, the population 
density appears statistically no significant, but with an awaited sign. The negative sign comes 
indeed, to confirm the opposite relation between the cost and the investment of education. 
The same result is obtained by Beine, Docquier and Rapoport (2008).    
Finally, the remittances constitute one of main sources of the investment in human capital for 
the middle-income countries. In fact, their coefficient equal to 0.35%. Their coefficients are, 
consequently, significant with the threshold of 1%. Many works supported the positive effect 
of the remittances on the reduction of the education cost (the World Bank (2006)). 
On the basis of the elasticities obtained from these estimations we calculate in the following 
subsection the net effect of emigration prospects on the human capital.    
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Constante                                                                                                   
 
-.2649721***
(-7.80)    
 
-.2560155***
(-7.14)    
 
-.2575489***    
(-6.89)    
 
-.2454228***    
(-6.49)    
 
ln hmoy, 90 
 
-.0354986    
(-0.31)    
 
-.056723    
(-0.51)    
 
- - 
ln gmpH, 90  
 
.020211***    
(3.99)    
 
.0178549***    
(4.14)    
 
.0194425***    
(3.60)    
 
.0169077***    
(3.85)    
 
ln gdp90 .0426197***    
(7.35)    
.0407222***    
(6.97)    
 
.0408208***    
(6.84)    
 
.0380247***    
(7.31)    
 
ln d_pop90 
 
-.0018432    
(-0.53)    
 
- 
-.00186    
(-0.54)    
 
- 
RM90 
 
.0036315***    
(4.78)    
 
.0035348***    
(4.61)    
 
.0035866***    
(4.60)    
 
.0034588***    
(4.35)    
 
 chi2 113.85 87.68 97.31 78.04 
Prob > chi2    0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
R2 0.6058 0.6140 0.6082 0.6146 
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3.5 Emigration prospects versus domestic conditions : The net effect of 
emigration prospects: Towards a new measures method 
3.5.1  The decomposition of gross investment of human capital     
The principal question valorizing the high-skilled emigration effect is: what’s the weight of 
emigration prospects in the all incentive effects? We assume in this case that there are two 
principal origins of incentive; one arriving from the emigration prospects and the other from 
the domestic conditions. The answer to this question permits to evaluate the importance of 
emigration effect. To reach this objective, we suggest a simple decomposition of gross 
investment of human capital in this section. Before we define this decomposition, we propose 
main definitions:     
The gross investment can be defined by the difference between the actual human capital in the 
last stage and the one of the first stage thus:    
a
H
a
Hh hhI 1990,2000, lnln −=                                                                                                         (20) 
Accordingly, to obtain a decomposition of gross investment of human capital it is necessary to 
determine the anticipated human capital that can be obtained following emigration. It is 
defined as:   
Definition 1: The anticipated human capital 
  If in the first stage (stage 0), the economy registers an emigration rate of high-skilled 
individuals (m) while hoping to achieve to the last stage (stage 1) a gain in human capital 
term, the anticipated human capital in stage 1 equal to: 
1990,21990,21990,2000, lnlnlnln HH
a
H
E
H mcgmpchh −+=                                                               (21) 
 
With EHh 2000,ln , 
a
Hh 1990,ln , 1990,ln Hgmp , 1990,ln Hm and 2c are respectively the anticipated human 
capital, the actual human capital in the stage 0, the indicator of emigration prospects in the 
stage 0 , the emigration rate in the stage 0 and the elasticity of the gross investment of human 
capital with respect to the emigration prospects. The equation (21) means that the anticipated 
human capital is determined by his actual level in the stage 0 plus the gross gain provided by 
the high-skilled emigration and reduced by the brain drain rate (the loss). Thus, we define this 
decomposition as follows: 
Definition 2: The decomposition of gross investment of human capital 
We assume there are two incentive effects of investment: the emigration prospects and the 
domestic conditions. The gross investment in human capital is already distributed between the 
two factors as follows: 
• The net domestic incentive effect (NDIE) equal to the difference between the actual 
level of human capital in last stage and the anticipated human capital: 
E
H
a
H hhNDIE 2000,2000, lnln −=  
• The net incentive quantitative effect of emigration prospects (NIQEEP) equal to the 
difference between the anticipated human capital and the actual level of human 
capital in the first stage: aHEH hhNIQEEP 1990,2000, lnln −=      
 Proof  
We can demonstrate this decomposition as: 
 2000,21990,21990,2000,2000,2000, lnlnlnlnlnln HH
a
H
a
H
E
H
a
H mcgmpchhhhNDIE +−−=−=             (22) 
This means that the difference between the actual level of human capital in last stage and the 
anticipated human capital is equal to the difference between the gross investment and the net 
effect of emigration (loss or gain). Therefore, this difference corresponds to the net domestic 
incentive effect (NDIE). 
  
14 
If we reduce the anticipated human capital by the actual level of human capital in the first 
stage we obtain: 
 )ln(lnlnlnlnlnlnln 1990,1990,21990,1990,21990,21990,1990,2000, HHaHHHaHaHEH mgmpchmcgmpchhh −=−−+=− (23) 
This result is similar to the net incentive quantitative effect of emigration prospects 
(NIQEEP). 
The sum between the two effects is equal to the gross investment of human capital: 
NDIENIQEEPI h +=                                                                                                            (24) 
We have now three possibilities in the last stage: The emigration generates a net loss, or it 
creates an incentive gain smaller than the one generated by the domestic effect. Finally, it can 
exercise an incentive effect bigger than the one generated by the internal conditions in the 
source country. It is noteworthy that all the previous results could not be obtained without 
referring to the characteristics of the source country (the development level, the emigration 
rate, the poverty…).  
If the anticipated human capital is inferior to the actual human capital in the first stage (the 
weak size of the emigration prospects), the domestic conditions generate the all incentive 
effects, but the emigration reduces the gross investment. However, if the anticipated human 
capital is superior to the actual human capital in the first stage, the emigration engenders the 
net incentive gain. 
   The calculation results can be exposed in the following table:    
        Table 2: The decomposition of gross investment of human capital: Averages by 
countries groups 
 
Classificati
on  
Countries 
groups h
I  NDIE  NIQEEP  jE
moyh
,
2000,ln  
 
 
 
World 
Bank  
 
 
MIDDLE-
INCOME 
COUNTRIES  
      0.04868        0.02422        0.02446        0.19462  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
By interest 
group  
LATIN 
AMERICA       0.03576        0.00910        0.02667        0.20804  
SUB-
SAHARAN 
COUNTRIES       0.03287        0.01286        0.02001        0.16016  
MIDDLE EST 
AND NORTH 
AFRICA       0.03735        0.00601        0.03134        0.18875  
NORTH AND 
CENTRAL 
AMERICA        0.06673        0.05499        0.01175        0.20642  
EUROPE 
      0.03294        0.00526        0.02768        0.24665  
CENTRAL 
AND SOWTH 
ASIA       0.02590        -0.01253       0.03843        0.19230  
SOWTH EST 
ASIA       0.03700        0.00477        0.03223        0.20692  
OCEANIA 
      0.09530        0.06145        0.03385        0.16301  
 
Table 2 shows that the NIQEEP  is positive for all groups. Indeed, 6 among 8 groups register 
a net effect of emigration prospects superior than the net domestic effect ( NDIE ). This 
means, that the skilled emigration has a net positive effect on human capital investment.  
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3.5.2.  The qualitative incentive effect of emigration prospects  
  On the basis of our theoretical model as well as the work of Docquier, Lohest and Marfouk 
(2007), we tend to propose a simple definition of qualitative effect of high-skilled emigration. 
This indicator can be defined as follows:  
Definition 3: The qualitative incentive effect 
The qualitative incentive effect can be defined as the ratio of the prospects intensity on the 
fraction of human capital that emigrates. If this indicator superior to one, we can conclude 
that the economy has a net qualitative brain gain. However, if this indicator is located 
between 0.5 and 1, we can say that the economy has the possibility to have a gross qualitative 
gain. 
ε
IPGQUA =                                                                                                                          (25) 
Definition 4: The prospects intensity 
The prospects intensity is equal to the ratio between the net incentive quantitative effect of 
emigration prospects (NIQEEP) and the gross investment in human capital: hI .                                                   
hINIQEEPIP /=                                                                                                                    (26) 
Docquier, Lohest and Marfouk (2007), define a decomposition of the emigration rate into two 
components: The first component is the ratio of emigrants to natives: the average or total 
emigration rate of all types of individuals. It reflects the degree of openness of the sending 
country. The second component is the ratio of the proportion of skilled emigrants by the same 
proportion among natives. This ratio reflects the schooling gap between emigrants and 
natives. This ratio is always higher than one, indicating that emigrants are more educated than 
natives in all developing countries. We consider that the last ratio is equivalent to the fraction 
of human capital that emigrates )(ε . This ratio is equal to the following equation: 
[ ]))(/)((
)/(
1,1,1,1,
1,1,
ss
s
HH
s
sH
MRMR
MM
SG
++
==
∑
∑
ε
      (27) 
With 1,HM , 1,sM , 1,HR  and 1,sR  are respectively, the high-skilled emigrants stock, the stock of 
emigrants having the s qualification, the high-skilled natives and the stock of natives having 
the s qualification; s = low, middle or high qualification.    
The equation (27) reflects the part of the human capital rate that emigrates in the human 
capital rate of natives and emigrants. 
This indicator of the qualitative effect of emigration permits to evaluate the participation of 
emigration in the production of human capital. If the gross investment is intensive in 
migratory effect, the report between the quantitative gain of the emigration and the gross 
investment is important. It is especially possible with the competition created by the strong 
selectivity to have a qualitative gain also. If this qualitative gain ratio passes the unit, this 
means that the human capital of the natives is superior to the one of emigrants and the 
developing economy recorded a net qualitative gain. The results can be presented in the 
following table: 
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Table 3:  The qualitative incentive effect of emigration prospects: 1990-2000: Averages by 
countries groups  
 
Classificatio
n  
Countries 
groups  IP    00_ε  
  
 GQUA   
 
 
 
World Bank  
 
 
MIDDLE-
INCOME 
COUNTRIES        1.24775        4.38164        0.33536  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
By interest 
group  
LATIN 
AMERICA       3.01558        2.99257        0.73291  
SUB-
SAHARAN 
COUNTRIES       0.97874        8.75812        0.14147  
MIDDLE EST 
AND NORTH 
AFRICA       0.89969        3.21794        0.33916  
NORTH AND 
CENTRAL 
AMERICA        0.39710        2.12102        0.18613  
EUROPE 
      0.91634        2.26414        0.57333  
CENTRAL 
AND SOWTH 
ASIA       1.53993        9.09506        0.16582  
SOWTH EST 
ASIA       1.16427        4.58222        0.34399  
OCEANIA       1.16032        7.26351        0.11936  
The results showed that if ε  is higher than the unit in the majority of countries, 
which tends to support the assumption taken in our theoretical model (see table 3). Indeed, 
we showed in our model that in the case where ∗< εε , the country has a possibility to 
register a net quantitative gain. Nevertheless, to know that ε  is lower or higher than the 
critical threshold, requires a rather long set of data. Thus, it is extremely important to 
announce that in this work the data do not make it possible to achieve this objective. 
Therefore, we orient our attention toward a verification of the possibility to register a 
qualitative gain. 
On average, the two groups of country of Latin America and Europe have a great 
possibility of recording an improvement in the quality of their human capital following the 
emigration. However, this improvement can be only gross. For the remainder, has not the 
possibility to have a qualitative gain. 
4.5.1 Conclusion   
In this paper we study the net effect of high-skilled emigration. Indeed, through the Solow 
model we elaborate a simple theoretical model that studies the net effect of high-skilled 
emigration. Thus, we incorporate the double effects: negative and positive effects. The 
negative effect is the quantity (rate) of skilled individuals that emigrates and the positive 
effect is the quantity (rate) that remains in his source country in long term. The result showed 
that emigration in the case where the fraction of human capital that emigrates is inferior to the 
critical level as well as in the case of strong selectivity adopted, the emigration has the 
possibility to create a quantitative and qualitative brain gain. 
Moreover, to determine the net effect of brain drain, we propose a simple new method that 
decomposes the gross investment of human capital into two components: the net domestic 
incentive effect and the net quantitative brain drain effect. Through This decomposition we 
can determine: what is the net quantitative effect that arrives from the domestic economy and 
what is the one arriving from the prospects effect. Finally, we tend to define the indicator of 
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the qualitative effect of this phenomenon. The empirical results showed that the emigration 
has an important effect on the human capital investment. Thus, the majority of countries have 
the possibility to register a net quantitative gain. Nevertheless, little of countries only have the 
possibility to record a qualitative brain gain.     
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Appendices  
 
A1: Proof of the equilibrium condition  
 
For all m = q = 0, C = C1 and the equilibrium can be located on the C curve.   
bmmqm −−−=−−− )1()1( εε  = )1( bm −−ε , for q = bm, with 0 <b <1, the 
quantity )1( bm −−ε , for given b, admits a solution b+=∗ 1ε  that is positive when b+>∗ 1ε  
and finally, it is negative for b+<∗ 1ε . 
 
Therefore C is superior to C1 when b+<∗ 1ε .  This means that  the equilibrium is located  
below the C. however, C is lower to C1  when b+>∗ 1ε  and therefore the equilibrium is 
located over to  the C. finally, if b+=∗ 1ε ,  C is equal to  C1  and the equilibrium 
corresponds to the one without emigration. It is clear, therefore, that when 0 <m <1, the 
position of the equilibrium is ambiguous; it can be below, to the over or on the C curve.          
For all -1 <m <0, q = 0, 1>ε  we have: 0<+− εmm , because, mm >ε , therefore C is 
always superior to C1, so the equilibrium is situated  below the C  curve.   
We can schematize this problem as follows:     
 
Graphic : 6 : the C1 curve with respect to C: the case of  : b+=> ∗ 1εε  and b+== ∗ 1εε  
for all  0 < m < 1.   
 
 
                                                   1 
                                 
                                     m = max                  
                           m > 0                        q>0 
                            
 
  
                       m = q = 0                                                              )( δ++ gn = C = C1 
                                                                                             [ ] 1)1()( Cqmgn =−−−++ εδ  
  
                                        
                                 h 
 
                                             -1  
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Graphic : 7-a : the C1 curve with respect to C: the case of : b+=< ∗ 1εε  and  C1  is convex  
for all  0 < m < 1 .   
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Graphic : 7-b : the C1 curve with respect to C: the case of: b+=< ∗ 1εε  and  C1  is concave 
for all  0 < m < 1.   
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